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IN THE 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Dennis J. Garcia, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for automobile homicide. This Court 
has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Court should assume the evidence sufficient where Defendant 
has failed to marshal crucial facts in support of the verdict, and, alternatively, 
whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Defendant of automobile homicide? 
Standard of Review. A reviewing court will decline to address the merits of a 
claim of insufficient evidence where defendant notably failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict. State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, ^ 25, 
989 P.2d 503. Alternatively," [w]hen a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that 
the evidence is insufficient,... [the appellate court] review[s] the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict,[and it] reverse[s] . . . only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, If 15,167 P.3d 503 (internal citations 
omitted). 
STATUTE 
The following statute is attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 76-5-207 (West Supp. 2008).1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with automobile homicide, a third degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-207 (West Supp. 2008), and failure to maintain 
control of a vehicle, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of SALT LAKE COUNTY CODE 
OF ORDINANCES, as amended. R10-13. The State dismissed the f ailure-to-maintain-
control-of-a-vehicle charge at trial. R103:3. The trial court denied Defendant's 
1
 The State cites to the current version of the Code for the convenience of the 
Court. Defendant was tried under the prior version of section 76-5-207, containing 
an amendment that is irrelevant to the disposition of this case. See Laws 2008, c. 226, 
§ 10, which rewrote subsec. (1), which formerly read: "(1) As used in this section, 
'motor vehicle' means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, 
truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft/' 
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motion for a directed verdict at the close of evidence at trial. R104:294. A jury 
found Defendant guilty of automobile homicide. R81. The trial court sentenced 
Defendant to a statutory term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. R84-
85. Defendant timely appealed. R86-87. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At about 1:00 a.m. on March 8,2006, Brandon Donivan was driving home on 
U - l l l , also known as Bacchus Highway in Salt Lake County. R103:91-92. At about 
5400 South, he came across a wrecked car that had crashed into the concrete median. 
Id. at 92, 111. He did not see anyone. Id. at 93. He slowed down as he passed the 
wreckage and then turned his car around to check to see if "everything was okay/7 
Id. At that point, he still did not see anyone, but when he turned around again, he 
saw Defendant / /stumble , / out of the car. Id. at 93-94. 
Defendant had blood on the left side of his face. Id. at 94. He walked to 
Donivan's car and Donivan lowered his window. Id. Defendant asked Donivan if 
he knew what had happened and if Donivan could give him a ride to his house. Id. 
at 95. Defendant appeared pretty confused, possibly in shock. Id. at 104. Donivan 
suggested that they stay with the car, but Defendant insisted. Id. At that point, 
Donivan had not noticed anyone else at the scene. Id. Defendant walked back to his 
car talked to someone in the rear of the car. Id. 95-96. Defendant tried to get the 
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person up and out of the car, but eventually gave up, walked back to Donivan's car, 
and got in. Id. at 96. 
After they drove for three or four minutes, Defendant asked again if Donivan 
had seen what had happened. Id. at 97. Defendant mentioned that his friend was 
not moving and suggested that they go back to his car. Id. at 97,100. He seemed 
concerned for his friend. Id. at 108. By the time they got back, two other people had 
arrived at the scene. Id. One of them was calling the police, who directed them to 
remove the rear passenger from the car. Id. at 108,98-99. Another person arrived at 
the scene and administered CPR to the unconscious passenger. Id. at 99. Moments 
later the police and paramedics arrived. Id. at 116-17. The car smelled of alcohol. 
Id. 
Jeff Gallegos and Matt Bruce were the two people at the scene when Donivan 
and Defendant returned there. Id. at 110-11. Gallegos and Bruce found Thomas 
Shane Buckley lying face down across the rear seat, his head to the driver's side and 
feet to passenger side, with his left arm on the back headrest. Id. at 113. Gallegos 
told Bruce that there was blood beneath Buckley's head, that he not responsive, and 
that he did not appear to be breathing. Id. at 113-14. Defendant was yelling at 
Buckley to rouse him, and said,"Shane, what did you do to my car?" Id. at 120,135. 
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Donivan did not think the roadway was not wet, see id, at 103, 122, but Bruce 
testified that it was a little bit wet. Id. at 132. 
West Valley Police Sergeant John Pearce arrived to supervise the official 
handling of the incident. Id. at 167-68. There, he was informed that Defendant was 
the owner of the wrecked car. Id. at 173. Sergeant Pearce asked Defendant if he 
knew what had happened. Id. at 172. Defendant said that "he was in the passenger 
seat and everything got messed up." Id, Defendant claimed that "the other guy" — 
Buckley —was the driver. Id, at 180. 
Defendant immediately seemed evasive to Sergeant Pearce in answering his 
questions. Id, When the Sergeant asked for his identification, Defendant asked why 
that information was needed. Id. When asked who injured person was, Defendant 
started to respond, saying the person was "Shane," but then stopped. Id. at 174. 
When Sergeant Pearce explained that Buckley's injuries were "very grave," that he 
" [might] not make it," and that" [h]e need[ed] to have his family members down at 
the hospital for him," Defendant still refused to provide any other identifying 
information for Buckley — "he jus t . . . wouldn't tell me." Id. Sergeant Pearce never 
was able to contact any of Buckley's family members so that they could respond at 
the hospital. Id. at 174-75. 
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Sergeant Pearce also noticed that Defendant's left ankle was swollen and bent. 
Id. at 175. Nevertheless, Defendant kept trying to leave the ambulance, trying to 
walk "on this obviously injured foot." Id. at 176. Defendant did not appear to 
Sergeant Pearce to be confused or unaware of what was going on. Id. at 179,182. 
Rather, he appeared "belligerent" and "very controlled" in what he told the officer. 
Id. 
Defendant was taken by ambulance and Buckley by helicopter to the hospital. 
Id. at 154-56, 171-72. 195-96. Buckley was pronounced dead later that morning. 
R104:195-96. 
Dr. Todd Grey, Chief Medical Examiner for Utah, autopsied Shane Buckley. 
R103:136. Dr. Grey found external abrasions over the center of Buckley's forehead, 
on his right cheek, and on his left, and more extensively, on his right, knees. Id. at 
139. He also found a laceration that had completely penetrated through Buckley's 
upper lip. Id. This wound could have bled copiously onto surrounding surfaces. 
Id. Internally, Dr. Grey found bruising of the deeper tissues of the scalp beneath the 
forehead abrasion and evidence of brain damage. Id. at 140. A blood test revealed 
the presence of breakdown products of cocaine and alcohol, the latter at a 
concentration of .07. Id. at 141. Dr. Grey certified that Buckley died of anoxic brain 
injury— brain death caused by insufficient oxygen from head injuries sustained in 
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the accident. Id. at 142. Dr. Grey could not determine from the pattern of the 
injuries whether Buckley was the passenger or the driver. Id. at 145. 
West Valley Police Officer David Black was called to the hospital to obtain a 
blood sample from Defendant. Id. Defendant refused to have his blood drawn and 
asserted that he had not been driving. Id. at 156-57. Officer Black warned 
Defendant that his driving privileges could be revoked for 18 months for if he 
refused. Id. at 157. Defendant still refused to have his blood drawn. Id. A search 
warrant was obtained, and Defendant's blood drawn. Id. at 158. The blood test 
revealed that Defendant's blood alcohol concentration was 0.15 grams per milliliter. 
Id. at 159; State's Exhibit 1 (Toxicology Report [Report], attached at Addendum B). 
The Report also revealed that Defendant's blood also contained THC, "the principle 
psychoactive constituent of marijuana," which, because it "disappears quickly from 
the blood," "indicate[d] either recent use or daily chronic use[.]" ~ .Id. at 2. 
Defendant's blood also contained benzoylecgonine, a pharmacologically inactive 
breakdown product, indicating Defendant's use of cocaine. Id. Such drugs cause 
"central nervous system stimulant effects can impair driving ability. The 
impairment may manifest itself as over-aggressive or irresponsible driving 
behavior, or may mimic depressant effects due to fatigue caused from overuse. Id. 
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West Valley City Detective Daren Getz investigated the incident. Rl04:189, 
193. The detective had been investigating traffic accidents for West Valley City for 
ten years. Id. at 189-90. He had completed numerous accident investigation and 
reconstruction trainings and had investigated "thousands" of traffic accidents. Id. at 
191-92. 
Detective Getz arrived at the scene of the accident at about 1:50 a.m. Id. at 
193. Buckley had already been airlifted by helicopter to the hospital and Defendant 
was just leaving in an ambulance. Id. at 194. As he approached the scene, he 
noticed the roadway was wet and the sky was overcast. Id. 
Defendant's wrecked car was faced northwesterly on the left side of the road 
with its left front tire up against the barricade. Id. at 196. From that point, the 
detective retraced and then reconstructed the path and movements of Defendant's 
car as it careened out of control to its final resting point. Id. at 196-99,202; see State's 
Ex. 2 (scaled diagram of accident scene, attached at Addendum C).2 Defendant's car 
2
 At trial, the diagram was introduced and received as State's Exhibit 2. 
R104:199, 201; Exhibit List (within unpaginated envelope stamped April 17, 2008, 
second day of trial). State's Exhibit 2 is missing from the trial exhibits. The same 
exhibit, however, was received at the preliminary hearing, and that exhibit, marked 
in that hearing as "State's Exhibit 1," is in the record and is attached to this brief at 
Addendum C. See R51:6-7, 16 (transcript of preliminary hearing, June 20, 2007); 
Exhibit List (within unpaginated envelope from preliminary hearing of June 20, 
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was traveling north before the accident Id, at 197. The wheels on the left side of 
Defendant's car crossed the eastern set of double yellow lines of the center median; 
the car then skidded across the two northbound lanes as Defendant braked, hitting 
the first guardrail. Id. at 203-06; State's Ex. 2 & 3.3 The right front rim of the car 
caught the guardrail causing the car to start to rotate clockwise. Id, at 208; State's 
Ex. 2. The car continued to rotate as it traveled forward and hit the second 
guardrail. Id. at The force of that impact—the car was then traveling at about fifty-
five to sixty miles per hour — drove the guardrail back and broke off two of its posts. 
Id. at 209-212,214-15; State's Ex. 12-16. The car's engine hood sheered off, the entire 
driver's side was crushed and the windshield folded. Id. at 207,210,212-13; State's 
Ex. 19-21, 23. Within the car, the car's forceful clockwise rotation would have 
caused Defendant and Buckley to move to their left and somewhat to the rear, as 
evidenced by imprints on the upholstery and the bent armrest and based on low-
speed field tests the detective conducted in his car. Id. at 218,231-33; State's Ex. 31-
33. 
2007). The State refers throughout this brief to the attached exhibit, marked "State's 
Exhibit 1," as "State's Exhibit 2," consistent with the trial transcript. 
3
 The State relies on State's Exhibits 2 and 3 — the scaled diagram and one of 
the photographs the prosecution used to illustrate the detective's testimony —to 
supply details not specifically testified to. 
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Detective Getz, noting that no part of the center console, including the 
steering wheel, was scuffed, bent, or displaced, eliminated the possibility that the 
passenger could have come across the center console from the passenger to the 
driver seat. Id. at 218-19, 227; State's Ex. 43-45. Scrape marks on the inside surface 
of the front seats and the imprint of a person on the rear seat further supported that 
the passenger was thrown from the front passenger seat into the rear of the vehicle, 
hitting the rear driver's side door, pushing it outward, and breaking the rear 
driver's side window. Id. at 219-23; State's Ex. 29-37. This was consistent with the 
location of the large blood stain on the rear seat where Buckley was found. Id. at 
222-23; State's Ex. 37. Sergeant Getz found no evidence that Buckley was the driver 
of the car — //[t]here's no way the driver was the one that . . . was in the back seat — 
or that any third occupant could have been thrown out of the car. Id. at 234, 246, 
280. 
A tuft of hair was found just above the driver's door. Id. at 224; State's Ex. 39-
41. DNA testing revealed that the hair positively matched Defendant, not Buckley. 
Id. at 224-25. Detective Getz examined Defendant at the hospital. Id. at 226. He 
found cuts and abrasions on the left side of Defendant's face, a left leg injury, and a 
cut to his scalp on the right side, from which hair had been "yanked." Id. at 226-27. 
Damage to the left front door — the driver's door — was consistent with Defendant's 
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injuries. Id. at 228. The pattern of cuts on the left side of Defendant's face was 
consistent with the pattern generated by the shattering of tempered glass, broken 
from the driver's window. Sergeant Getz opined that Defendant received the 
abrasions and cuts to the left head side of his head when it broke through the 
driver's window and then received the cut to the right side of his scalp and the loss 
of the tuft of hair when his head came back through the broken window. Id. at 229-
30; State's Ex. 48-51. 
Based on his training and experience Detective Getz could determine the 
speed of a vehicle "to a great certainty." Id. at 290. He determined that at the point 
where he "found our first evidence mark" — the skid marks where Defendant's car 
crossed the double yellow lines of the median and Defendant began to brake — the 
car was traveling at sixty-five miles per hour. Id. at 204,290-91; State's Ex. 2-5 The 
posted speed limit at that last point was sixty miles per hour. Id. at 291. 
Defendant did not testify. R104:l-296. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should summarily affirm Defendant's conviction for automobile 
homicide. The only two contested issues on appeal are whether the evidence was 
sufficient to show (1) that Defendant was the driver on the car that caused the 
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accident resulting in the victim's death and (2) whether it was sufficient to show that 
Defendant operated the car in a negligent manner in causing the fatal accident. 
On the issue of whether Defendant was the driver, there was testimony from 
an experienced accident reconstructionist that upon impact the driver's head in a car 
rotating clockwise would be thrown out the driver's window. DNA evidence 
positively confirmed that a tuft of hair over the driver's door belonged not to the 
victim, but to Defendant, the left side of whose face bore lacerations characteristic of 
shattered glass from the broken window. The reconstructionist, who had 
investigated "thousands" of traffic accidents, found no damage to the car's console 
or steering wheel, negating any possibility that Defendant could have been thrown 
from the front passenger seat to the driver's seat. Further, the reconstructionist 
credibly testified that a person in a vehicle rotating rapidly clockwise would be 
thrown diagonally backward. This assessment was corroborated by impressions 
between the two front seats and the victim's resting place above the blood-stained 
rear seat cushions. 
On the issue of negligent operation of the car, there was evidence that 
Defendant had residues of marijuana and cocaine in his blood and that his blood 
alcohol level was 0.15 percent— almost twice the legal level. At sixty-five miles per 
hour, Defendant was driving five miles per hour over the legal speed limit. It was 
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dark and overcast outside. The road was unilluminated and wet. The left "wheels 
of Defendant's car crossed the median lines. Then the car skidded back across two 
lanes and hit the guardrail. 
Defendant has failed to marshal most of the aforementioned evidence, and 
therefore, the Court should decline to consider his insufficiency claim. 
Alternatively, the evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant was the driver 
on his car and that he operated it in a negligent manner. The trial court , 
consequently, did not err in denying Defendant's request for a directed verdict. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE 
EVIDENCE WHERE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL 
CRUCIAL FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THE VERDICT; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
CONVICT DEFENDANT OF AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE AND 
CONSEQUENTLY THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DENYING DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR A DIRECTED 
VERDICT 
Defendant claims that the "Court should reverse Mr. Garcia's conviction for 
automobile homicide because the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that he was 
driving the car or that he was negligent/' Aplt. Br. a 12. Defendant's claim fails. 
Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict, and 
therefore, this Court should decline to consider his claim. Even if this Court 
considers the merits, however, the evidence supports that Defendant was driving 
the car and that his operation of it was negligent. Consequently, the trial court did 
not err in denying Defendant's motion for a directed verdict.4 
4
 Defendant admits that he did not specifically preserve the sufficiency 
arguments he now raises on appeal. See Aplt. Br. at 2 (admitting that the defense 
argued only that the evidence was "inconclusive" in moving for a directed verdict). 
Defendant concedes, therefore, that he must now establish not only that the 
evidence is insufficient, but also that "the insufficiency was so obvious and 
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. 
(quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 17,10 P.3d 346). See also Aplt. Br. at 11,13, 
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A. Because Defendant has failed to marshal crucial facts in support of 
the verdict, the Court should assume that the evidence adequately 
supports the verdict and decline to consider Defendant's claim 
that the evidence was insufficient. 
A defendant who claims the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict has a burden to "'first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding/ , , State v. Prichett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 25, 69 P.3d 1284 (quoting Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9)). "Such a burden is indeed significant " Id. The defendant 
"must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and 
then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack/" State v. Larsen, 
16-18 & 21-22 (arguing plain error). Even if the issue were preserved, however, the 
analysis and result in this case would be the same. 
The standard for establishing that the trial court committed plain error in 
submitting the case to the jury is necessarily greater than the basic sufficiency 
standard. Compare Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17 (applying plain error standard in "the 
case in which the State presents no evidence to support an essential element of a 
criminal charge") with State v. Hirschi, 2007 UT App 255, f 15, 167 P.3d 503 
(reversing "only when the evidence . . . is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted7") (ellipsis added) 
(citation omitted). Both standards require Defendant to establish, at least, that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove an essential element of the offense. As argued 
below, the State clearly presented evidence to support that Defendant was the 
driver and operated the car negligently. Consequently, whether under plain error 
or basic sufficiency standards, Defendant's claim of insufficiency fails. The State, 
therefore, addresses on the sufficiency of the evidence. 
15 
2000 UT App 106, f 11, 999 P.2d 1252 (citation omitted). The marshaled evidence 
must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Pricltett, 2003 UT 24, f^ 
25. "Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 
P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App.1991). Then, after gathering "this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. 
"Where a party fails to meet the marshaling requirement, we generally will assume 
that the evidence on record adequately supports the trial court's findings." State v. 
Chavez-Esy)inoza, 2008 UT App 191, f^ 20,186 P.3d 1023. See e.g., State v. Sheplierd, 
1999 UT App 305, % 25,989 P.2d 503 (declining to address the merits of insufficiency 
claim where the defendant notably failed to marshal the evidence in support of the 
jury's verdict). 
For the jury to find Defendant guilty of automobile homicide, the State had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant (1) drove the car involved in the 
accident; (2) while having sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical 
test showed that he had a blood alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
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time of the test; and (3) caused Buckley's death by operating the car in a negligent 
manner. See Addendum A (statute). 
Defendant does not dispute that he had a blood alcohol concentration of .15 
grams per milliliter when he blood was tested. R103:159; State's Exhibit 1 
(Toxicology Report). Thus, the only issues on appeal, as at trial, are whether the 
evidence was sufficient to prove that Defendant was the driver of the car and 
whether, if he was the driver, he operated it negligently. 
Defendant has notably failed to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's 
verdict on these disputed points. 
1. Defendant has not fully marshaled the evidence showing that 
he was driving the car at the time of the accident. 
Defendant marshals the following evidence in support of the jury's verdict: 
• "witness testimony that Mr. Buckley was lying face down in the 
back seat of the car after the accident"; 
• "Dr. Grey's testimony that Mr. Buckley likely died from brain 
injuries sustained during the accident and that Mr. Garcia was 
intoxicated at the time of the accident"; and 
• "Officer Getz's theory regarding the motion of the occupants in the 
vehicle." 
17 
Aplt. Br. at 14-15. Thereafter, Defendant briefly summarizes Detective Getz's 
reconstruction of the accident, based on the detective's making slow-speed turns, his 
observations of the accident scene, including "damage to the car and the guardrails 
and skidmarks on the road," a "diagram of the accident" showing "possible 
movement of the car," a "'tuft' of Mr. Garcia's hair found in the upper-middle of the 
driver's side door," "lacerations on the right side of Mr. Garcia's head and a minor 
left leg injury," "and the eyewitnesses' account of Mr. Buckley ['s] position in the car 
after the accident." Aplt. Br. at 15. 
The foregoing summary hardly presents] "in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1315. Nor does 
Defendant then " demonstrate [s] that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict." Prichett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 25. 
Contrary to Defendant's summary, the State introduced extensive testimony 
about Buckley's position in the car and his relation to the major blood stains on the 
back seat to show that Buckley was not the driver: 
• Witnesses found Buckley's head lay directly over a large blood stain 
on the left side of the rear passenger seat (R103:113-14; 104:222;-23; 
State's Ex. 37); 
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• Dr. Grey testified that the laceration that completely penetrated 
Buckley's lip could have bled copiously onto surrounding surfaces 
(R103:139); 
• Detective Getz found scrape marks on the inside surface of the front 
seats and the imprint of a person on the rear seat, indicating that a 
body had passed through that space. These marks and impressions 
indicated that a person was thrown from the front passenger seat into 
the rear of the vehicle, hitting the rear driver's side door, pushing it 
outward, and breaking the rear driver's side window. Id. at 219-23; 
State's Ex. 29-37. 
• Witnesses found Buckley barely breathing and unconscious, his 
head, torso, and left leg on the rear seat, pointing to the driver's side of 
the car, his right leg lying in the space behind the front passenger's seat 
(R103:98-99,113-14). 
Defendant also fails to marshal the evidence that explains how Buckley came 
to rest in the back seat and how Detective Getz would have been regarded as a 
credible, experienced witness: 
• Skid marks on the side of the road that matched the two front 
wheels evidenced that after the car hit the first guardrail it began to 
rotate to the right (clockwise) (R:104:208-09; State's Ex. 2,13); 
• The sheering of two guardrail posts and their substantial 
displacement rearward, coupled with evidence of massive damage to 
the whole front of the car, attest that the car was almost perpendicular 
to the roadway; that is, the car was rotating to the clockwise when it 
slammed into the second guardrail (R:104:208-09; State's Ex. 2,14-16, 
27); 
• Between impacts with the two guardrails, the car was rotating 
rapidly (R104:215); 
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• Detective Getz testified that if a car was rotating to the right 
(clockwise), objects within would be thrown to the left of the interior, 
which he corroborated with low-speed tests in a vehicle (Rl04:218,231-
32); 
• Detective Getz found no evidence that Buckley was the driver of the 
car —"[tjhere's no way the driver was the one that . . . was in the back 
seat— or that any third occupant could have been thrown out of the 
car" (R104:234, 246, 280); 
• Detective Getz, who had been investigating traffic accidents for West 
Valley City for ten years, had completed numerous accident 
investigations and reconstruction trainings and had investigated 
"thousands" of traffic accidents (R104:189-92). 
Although Defendant marshals that a tuft of his hair was found directly over 
the driver's door, he has nevertheless failed to marshal other important evidence 
that shows that he, not Buckley, was the driver: 
• Detective Getz found that no part of the center console, including the 
steering wheel, was scuffed, bent, or displaced, which eliminated the 
possibility that any body could have come across the center console 
from the passenger to the driver seat R104:218-19, 227; State's Ex. 43-
45); 
• Damage to the driver's door was consistent with Defendant's left leg 
injuries (Rl04:228); 
• The pattern of cuts on the left side of Defendant's face was consistent 
with the pattern generated by the shattering of tempered glass, broken 
from the driver's window (Rl04:229-30; State's Ex. 48-51); 
• Detective Getz opined that Defendant received the cut to the right 
side of his scalp and the loss of the tuft of hair when his head came 
back through the broken window (R104:229-30; State's Ex. 48-51); 
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• Detective Getz's road tests helped confirm that if he turned his 
vehicle hard to the right, even at low speed, his head "would have 
gone right out the window (Rl04:231). 
In sum, because Defendant has substantially failed to marshal the evidence 
establishing that he was the driver of the car, this Court should assume that the 
evidence on record adequately supports that finding and decline to consider the 
issue. 
2. Defendant has not marshaled any of the evidence showing 
that he operated his car in a negligent manner. 
Defendant asserts that" [ojther than evidence indicating that Mr. Garcia had a 
blood alcohol level above the legal limit, there was simply no evidence to suggest 
that he had been operating the vehicle negligently at the time the accident 
occurred/' Aplt. Br. at 21 (emphasis added). In challenging the verdict, Defendant 
correctly observes that section 76-5-207 plainly precludes the determination of 
negligence based only an unlawful blood alcohol level. Aplt. Br. at 18-19. See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (West Supp. 2008) ("Criminal homicide is automobile 
homicide . . . if the person operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing 
the death of another and [] has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent 
chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater at the time of the test[.]") (emphasis added). However, without 
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regard to all the evidence introduced at trial, "including all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom," see Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, ^  11, he incorrectly assumes that the 
jury disregarded the trial court's instructions and apparently "attempted to collapse 
the negligence element into the intoxication element." Aplt Br. at 18, 20 (quoting 
from Jury Instruction 31, R79, that the jury could "consider the degree of 
intoxication or the amount of alcohol consumed by the defendant as one of tlte factors 
in determining whether the defendant was negligent while operating the motor 
vehicle") (emphasis in Aplt. Br. at 20). In fact, there is substantial evidence of 
Defendant's negligent operation of his car, in addition to his unlawful level of 
intoxication, which he has failed to marshal. 
For purposes of third-degree-felony automobile homicide, "'negligent' means 
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and 
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances." UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-5-207 (c) (West Supp. 2008). In addition to his unlawful level of intoxication, 
Defendant has failed to marshal other important evidence that he "fail[ed] to 
exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under" the 
circumstances here: 
• At the point Defendant's car first began to skid, he was driving his 
car at sixty-five miles per hour, five miles per hour over the posted 
limit (R104:291); 
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• The road was wet (R103:132; 104:193); 
• The accident occurred around 1:00 am and the sky was overcast—it 
was dark outside (R103:91-92,124; 104:193); 
• The road was not flanked with light poles; thus, it was 
unilluminated (State's Ex. 4); 
• The car crossed the double yellow lines of the center median and 
then skidded back across the two northbound lanes as Defendant 
braked, hitting the first guardrail (R104:203-06; State's Ex. 2 & 3). 
• A witness observed Defendant—whose blood contained nearly 
twice the legal limit for alcohol, indicated either recent or chronic use 
of marijuana, and showed a breakdown product of cocaine — "stumble" 
as he exited his car (R103:94,159; State's Exhibit 1 (Toxicology Report)); 
• "Drugs that cause central nervous system stimulant effects can 
impair driving ability. The impairment may manifest itself as over-
aggressive or irresponsible driving behavior, or may mimic depressant 
effects due to fatigue caused from overuse." See Report at 2. 
Because Defendant has not marshaled this evidence, which supports each 
element and from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that Defendant 
failed "to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise 
under like or similar circumstances," this Court should assume the evidence 
sufficient. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-207 (c) (West Supp. 2008). Alternatively, 
even if the merits are considered, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict. 
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B. Alternatively, the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's 
conviction for automobile homicide. 
Even if the merits are considered, no error occurred. 
"When a jury verdict is challenged on the ground that the evidence is 
insufficient,... [the appellate court] review [s] the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict,[and it] 
reverse[s] . . . only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted/" Hirschi, 
2007 UT App 255, f 15 (citations omitted). Here, ample evidence supported that 
Defendant was the driver of the car and that at the time of the accident he operated 
the car in a negligent manner causing Buckley's death. Consequently, whether 
under a plain error or basic insufficiency standard, the evidence was sufficient and 
no error occurred. 
1. The evidence establishes that Defendant was the driver of his 
car at the time of the accident. 
The evidence amply establishes that Defendant was the driver. 
In State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479 (Utah 1984), the court upheld convictions for 
negligent homicide and driving while under the influence of alcohol where the 
evidence on the only disputed issue — whether the defendant was the driver— was 
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no greater than in this case. Id. at 483. The State alleged that Lawson, having a 
blood alcohol level of 0.15 percent, was driving his Blazer when it rear-ended 
another car that had pulled off the road, killing one of its occupants. Id. at 480. A 
witness to the collision testified that he saw the driver crawl out of the Blazer, that 
he did not see any one else in the area, and that he later saw the driver standing 
around the scene of the accident. Id. at 481. Police, who arrived at the scene almost 
immediately after the accident, testified that no one was found thrown from the 
Blazer. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected Lawson's claim that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that he was the driver of the Blazer that caused the accident. Id. 
at 483. The court noted that no one actually observed appellant driving the Blazer. 
Id. Nevertheless, summarizing the evidence set out above, the court stated," There 
is substantial circumstantial evidence even if direct evidence is lacking to support 
the jury's conclusion and this Court cannot say that it was unreasonable for the jury 
to find that appellant was the operator of the Blazer involved in the collision/7 Id. 
Here, the circumstantial evidence that Defendant was driving his car at the 
time of the accident is just as telling, if not more so, than in Lawson. Unlike Lawson, 
there is undisputed physical evidence — Defendant's tuft of hair — tying Defendant 
to the driver seat. DNA testing revealed that the hair positively matched Defendant, 
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not Buckley. Id. at 224-25. Moreover, Detective Getz opined that the physical 
evidence supported that Buckley was thrown from the front -passenger seat to the 
rear, where his head came to rest over a large blood stain on the rear seat. See 
discussion at p. 19-20. Detective Getz stated "[t]here's no way the driver was the 
one that . . . was in the back seat—or that any third occupant could have been 
thrown out of the car." Rl04:234,246,280. Detective Getz also opined, based on the 
physical evidence, that Defendant was the driver where his head broke the driver's 
window, leaving a characteristic pattern on the left side of his face and there was no 
damage or marring to the center console or the steering wheel, which negated any 
possibility that that Defendant had been flung from the front passenger seat into the 
driver's seat. See discussion at p. 21. In sum, the evidence was sufficient to establish 
that Defendant was the driver of his car when the crash occurred. 
2. The evidence was sufficient to establish that Defendant 
operated his car in a negligent manner. 
In State v. Hambhn, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983), Hamblin was driving at forty-
five to fifty miles per hour. Id. at 377. The speed limit was forty miles per hour. Id. 
The road was wet. Id. It was evening. Id. An officer testified that a safe speed 
would have been about thirty to thirty-five miles per hour. Id. As Hamblin 
approached a yellow traffic light, he accelerated to at least sixty-four miles per hour 
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and passed through the intersection as the light turned red. Id. As Hamblin drove 
through the intersection, another driver was attempting a left turn. Id. Hamblin 
braked and skidded over sixty feet before colliding with the on-coming vehicle. Id. 
The driver of the vehicle was thrown through the windshield and was killed. Id. 
An officer at the scene testified that if Hamblin had been driving at the legal speed 
limit the would have been able to stop before the impact. Id. A blood test revealed 
that Hamblin had a 0.12 percent alcohol level. Id. Proof of automobile homicide 
was established by a showing of simple negligence. Id. at 378. Notwithstanding 
that the deceased driver had a blood alcohol level of 0.10 per cent, the Utah Supreme 
Court upheld Hamblin's conviction for automobile homicide against his claim that 
his intoxication could not be held to be the proximate cause of the victim's death. Id. 
at 379. 
In State v. Wade, 572 P.2d398 (Utah 1977), Wade drove across the median, 
causing a head-on collision with an on-coming automobile, killing three of its 
occupants. Id. at 399. Wade had a blood alcohol content of 0.12 percent. Id. The 
supreme court affirmed the trial court's finding that Wade's driving on the wrong 
side of the street was negligent and constituted sufficient evidence to support 
automobile homicide. See also State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061,1062-63 (Utah 1977) 
(evidence that driver with blood alcohol level of .22 percent who crossed median 
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island into on-coming traffic, thereby causing fatal collision, sufficient to support 
conviction for automobile homicide); State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056,1056-57 (Utah 
1977) (upholding conviction for automobile homicide where driver, with blood 
alcohol content of 0.13 percent, did not dispute his simple negligence in crashing his 
car into backhoe on opposite side of highway, killing one of his passengers).5 State 
v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,11J19-21, 999 P.2d 1252 (recognizing that a defendant, 
having only "a small amount of alcohol in his system/' who made a left turn into an 
oncoming driver, was "apparently negligent/' albeit not criminally negligent). 
The sum of evidence in support of Defendant's negligent operation of his car 
is substantially the same as that supporting the cases cited. That is, Defendant 
"fail[ed] to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise 
under like or similar circumstances." See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-207 (c) (West 
Supp. 2008). 
5
 In Wade, Anderson, and Durrant, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
statutorily required showing for automobile homicide under section 76-5-207 was 
simple, not criminal, negligence. Wade, 572 P.2d at 399-400; Anderson, 561 P.2d at 
1063; Durrant, 561 P.2d at 1057-58. In State v. Chavez, the court reversed its view, 
holding that the required showing was criminal negligence. Id., 605 P.2d 1226,1227-
28 (Utah 1979). Current section 76-5-207 explicitly requires a showing of only 
"simple negligence" to support, as in this case, a conviction for third-degree-felony 
automobile homicide. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-207(c) (West Supp. 2008). 
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Defendant breached that duty of care by first intoxicating himself to almost 
twice the legal limit for alcohol. R103:94; State's Exhibit 1 (Toxicology Report). One 
witness saw Defendant stumble as he exited his car. R103:94. In addition, his blood 
contained residues of marijuana and cocaine. State's Ex. 1. Evidence established 
The jury received the Toxicology Report, which stated that Drugs that cause central 
nervous system stimulant effects can impair driving ability through either over-
aggressive or irresponsible driving behavior." Id. See Lawson, 688 P.2d at 481 
(recounting testimony of physician that "driving impairments encountered by an 
operator of a motor vehicle at blood levels less than .141 are substantial"). From all 
this evidence, the reasonable inference is that Defendant was unable to drive safely 
due to excessive consumption of alcohol and negligent in attempting to operate a 
vehicle given his state of intoxication. See Durrant, 561 P.2d at 1058 ("The driving of 
an automobile upon the highways of this state by one who is so inebriated that he 
cannot safely operate it is an act which is reckless and in marked disregard for the 
safety of others.") Moreover, while the jury could not have relied exclusively on 
Defendant's intoxicated condition to find that he negligently operated his car, see 
discussion at p. 21-22., it was permitted to consider it as a factor. See State v. Ruben, 
663 P.2d 445, 449 (Utah 1983) ("While it is no longer appropriate to consider 
intoxication and negligence as a single element, it is appropriate to consider the 
29 
degree and effects of intoxication as a 'factor' in determining whether a defendant's 
conduct was criminally negligent.") 
Further, Defendant was exceeding the posted speed limit by five miles per 
hour. Rl04:291. while not necessarily excessive, the conditions — an overcast sky, a 
dark, unilluminated, and wet road —may have rendered even the posted speed 
unsafe. R103:91-92,124,132; 104:193; State's Ex. 4. Indeed, the speed was sufficient 
that Defendant partially crossed the median lines and skidded across two lanes of 
traffic before hitting the guardrail. Rl04:203-06. 
Defendant argues that the foregoing evidence is insufficient because it does 
not "illuminatfe] what caused the car to veer off the road." Aplt. Br. at 20. "For 
example," he continues, "there were no cell phone records introduced to establish 
that either occupant was on the phone or sending text messages at the time of the 
accident and no testimony was offered to establish that the vehicle's driver had 
dozed off." Id. at 20-21. As the cases cited above make clear, no specifically 
identifiable causal agent is necessary to support a conviction of automobile 
homicide. Indeed, those cases and the plain language of section 76-5-207 plainly 
show that the fact of intoxication and negligent operation is all that is required. 
In sum, the foregoing evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, is not "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
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West's Utah Code Annotated (West Supp. 2008) 
§ 76-5-207, Automobile homicide 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Drug" or "drugs" means: 
(i) a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(ii) a drug as defined in Section 58-17b-102; or 
(iii) any substance that, when knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly taken 
into the human body, can impair the ability of a person to safely operate a 
motor vehicle. 
(b) "Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any 
automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(2)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person 
operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or 
greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at 
the time of operation. 
(b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is 
subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2). 
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(3)(a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person 
operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another 
and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or 
greater at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of 
safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at 
the time of operation. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal negligence as 
defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the 
provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 
apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section. 
(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made 
in accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(l). 
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally 
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense. 
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is 
admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
Laws 1985, 1st Sp.Sess., c. 1, § 1; Laws 1988, c. 148, § 2; Laws 1993, c. 161, § 3; Laws 
2002, c. 106, § 9, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 10, § 2, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, 
c. 228, § 6, eff. May 3, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 2, § 301. eff. Feb. 2, 2005: Laws 2006. c. 
341, § 8, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2008, c. 226, § 10, eff. July 1, 2008. 
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Governor 
STATE OF UTAF1 
DEPARTMENT OF HE ^ *J1 
DIVISION OF EPIDEMIOLOGY L LABORATORY SERVICES 
BUREAU OF FORENSIC TOXICOLOGY 
46 North Medical Drive 
Sajt U t e City, Utah 84113-1105 
(803J 5B4-M00 
C80J) 584-6415 FAX 
TOXICOLOGY REPORT 
Agency; 
WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPT. 
Suspect* 
GARCIA, DENNIS J* 
11/28/1973 
UT15086S378 
Officer: 
D. BLACK 
Laboratory Number: 
L200S-067S 
Date Received: 
03/08/2006 
Agency Case Number; 
061009817 
LABORATORY FINDINGS: 
Blood Alcohol: 0.15 grama ethanol/lOOml blood 
Analysed by Bruce Beck -JCML-
BLOOD THC: Greater than 1 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) 
BLOOD TBC-COOH METABOLITE: Greater than 5 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) 
Analysed by Anthonette P. McCoy /X^us-w^ -/K. 
BLOOD COCAINE J Not Detected 
BLOOD BENZOYLECGONINE: Greater than 0*05 micrograms per milliliter (ug/ml) 
The above analyses were performed by GC/MS. 
Analyzed by Amber M. Scheid 
u 
. 7 
No selected prescription drugs were identified in the blood 
Analyzed by Supaxt RasmuBsen 
BLOOD METHAMPHETAMINE/MORPHINE: Not Detected 
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DRUGI DESCRIPTIONSy 
Delta-£-Tetrahydrocarmabinol (THC) is the principle psychoactive constituent of 
marijuana. When smoked/ it is rapidly distributed to various tissues and 
disappears quickly from the blood. If found, (possible in blood only) , it 
indicates either recent use or chronic daily use of marijuana. 
ll-Nor-9-CARBOXY-DELTA-9-TETRAHYDROCANNABINOIi is the primary metabolite of 
delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol which is the principle psychoactive constituent of 
marijuana. It is an inactive metabolite, and may be detected in blood for up ro 
2 days depending upon the subject'0 frequency of use and laboratories reporting 
cut off value. 
BENZOYLECGONTNE is a hydrolysis product of cocaine without pharmacological 
activity. Its presence in a biological sample is an indication of cocaine use. 
Drugs that cause central nervous system stimulant effects can impair driving 
ability. The impairment may manifest itself as over-aggressive or irresponsible 
driving behavior, or may mimic depressant effects due to fatigue caused from 
overuse, 
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CASE NUMBER 06i009817 PAGE: 1 0F1 
10 20 30 40 50 ft 
West Valley City Police Department 
INVESTIGATOR Getz LOCATION 5500 South U-111 COUNTY Salt Lake 
WEATHER Wind ROAD COND Wet DATE DRAWN October 12 2006 TIME OF INCIDENT 0100 hrs 
DRAWN BY Getz PHOTO FILE 06-9817 DATE March 8 2006 SCALE 1 inch =15 feet 
